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Every quantifier isn’t the same:
Informativity matters for ambiguity resolution
in quantifier-negation sentences
Noa Attali
UC Irvine
nattali@uci.edu
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Introduction

Empirical work on quantifier-not sentences has focused primarily on universal quantifiers, exploring
the ambiguity that arises when logical operators interact (e.g., Everyone didn’t go could mean No one
went or Not all went). In their Rational Speech Act
model of this ambiguity resolution, Savinelli et al.
(2017) demonstrate that pragmatic factors (such as
model priors over the likely world states) stand to
explain divergent behavior between children and
adults. We extend this work to a broader empirical
base, exploring the model’s predictions for sentences with a wider range of quantifiers (some, no);
we then test those predictions against behavioral
data collected in a series of experiments. We find
that a straightforward extension of the Savinelli
et al. model captures the range of quantifier-not behavior we gather, thereby providing strong support
for this cognitive model of probabilistic ambiguity
resolution. In particular, the model explains interpretation preferences on the basis of informativity
and prior beliefs over world states, such that interpretations that are more informative are preferred.

2

Model

Following Savinelli et al. (2017), we use a Rational
Speech Act (RSA) model (Frank and Goodman,
2012) to formally articulate the cognitive process
that yields observed interpretations of scopallyambiguous utterances. We adapt Savinelli et al.’s
model, which describes scope ambiguity resolution
for every, to additionally account for some and no
(see Figure 1). Hearing a quantifier-not utterance
(i.e., Every/Some/No marble isn’t red), a pragmatic
listener L1 reasons jointly about the true world
state (i.e., the number of red marbles in a 3-marble
world), the Question Under Discussion (QUD, i.e.,
the implicit topic: Are all/no marbles red?, How
many marbles are red?), and the scope (surface:
quantifier > not; inverse: not > quantifier).
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PL1 (w, i, q|u) ∝ P (w) · P (i) · P (q) · PS1 (u|w, i, q)
PS1 (u|w, i, q) ∝ exp(α · log(L0 (x|u, i, q)))
X
δx=[[q]](w) · PL0 (w|u, i)
PL0 (x|u, i, q) ∝
w

L0 (w|u, i) ∝ δ[[u]]i (w) · P (w)

Figure 1: RSA model. Hearing a quantifier-not utterance, a pragmatic listener (L1 ) reasons about the true
world state w, the likely QUD q, and the scope interpretation i that the speaker (S1 ) meant by utterance u. S1
selects u by reasoning about a naive listener (L0 ), who
infers the state s on the basis of u’s semantics, [[u]]i , a
mapping from worlds to truth values parameterized by
the scope interpretation i: e.g., [[every-not]]surface maps
only w = 0 to true and [[every-not]]inverse maps only
w = 3 to false. δ[[u]]i (w) = 1 when [[u]]i (w) is true
and 0 otherwise. A QUD q maps worlds to partitioned
sets of worlds x: e.g., q= are all red? maps w = 3 to
x = {3} and w = 0 to x = {0, 1, 2}. δx=[[q]](w) = 1
when x =[[q]](w) and 0 otherwise.

Parameter setting. Savinelli et al. found that
adult-like behavior (e.g., endorsing an every-not
utterance like Every marble isn’t red in a scenario
where not all marbles are red) required a prior over
world states that strongly favored the all state; we
term this a “high positive expectation”. Motivated
by these analytic results, we set P (w) in our model
to favor all marbles being red (P (w = 3) = 0.9).
We kept the priors over QUD and scope interpretation uniform, and set α = 1 (i.e., no scaling).
Predictions. Under these parameter settings, the
model predicts that the proportion of inverse interpretations depends on the quantifier: every-not>nonot>some-not (see Figure 3). The model makes
these predictions because the listener L1 reasons
that the speaker S1 maximizes the probability that
the listener L0 will arrive at the true world state.
More specifically, given the prior expectation that
all marbles are red, both every-not (surface scope:
none; inverse scope: not all) and some-not (surface
scope: not all; inverse scope: none) are maximally
informative ways of conveying that the prior high
positive expectation is false. However, there are
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more ways for not all to be true than for none to
be true (and so not all maximizes the probability
of arriving at the true world state). So, the listener
reasons that the speaker is most likely to intend
the not all meaning for both (i.e., inverse for everynot and surface for some-not). For no-not, there
is no strong pressure toward either interpretation;
surface scope (all) is slightly preferred to inverse
scope (some) because of a weak specificity implicature that strengthens the meaning of no-not to
the stronger surface interpretation (all) compatible
with the high positive expectation.

3

Experiments

To test the modeled listener’s predictions, we
measured interpretation behavior in a paraphraseendorsement task (Scontras and Goodman, 2017)
wherein participants encounter a potentiallyambiguous utterance (e.g., Every marble isn’t red)
and rate unambiguous paraphrases (e.g., None/Not
all of the marbles are red). To identify the appropriate paraphrases for surface vs. inverse interpretations of our three potentially-ambiguous utterances,
we had participants (N=94) complete a reference
task: given a paraphrase, select the scenario that
the paraphrase likely described. Participants chose
at ceiling the image consistent with the intended
scope interpretation for each of the paraphrases
(e.g., the image of 0-of-3 red marbles for None
of the marbles are red and 2-of-3 red marbles for
Not all of the marbles are red). Having validated
our paraphrases, we used them in the paraphraseendorsement task where participants (N=47) saw
three potentially-ambiguous utterances in random
order and rated unambiguous paraphrases (Fig. 2).

Figure 3: Results comparing model predictions and human data. Grey: Model predictions for L1 marginal
distribution over interpretation i. P (w = 3) = 0.9.
Yellow: Degree of agreement with each paraphrase in
task. Error bars are bootstrapped 95% CIs.

for the pragmatic listener’s marginal distribution
over scope interpretations align with interpretation
patterns in the paraphrase endorsement task (Fig.
3). The results capture the intuition that adults understand a quantifier-not sentence as a negation of
the high positive expectation.
In the case of some, human responses were more
categorical than the model predictions, which may
be due to some’s status as a positive polarity item
(PPI) that does not scope under negation (Szabolcsi,
2004). However, our modeling results offer an
explanation for why some would be a PPI in the
first place: interpreting some under negation results
in an utterance that is either uninformative or has
an unlikely meaning, and therefore is not efficient.
More broadly, our adapted RSA model implements the hypothesis that interpretation proceeds
through recursive reasoning, hinges on a cooperative, efficient speaker, and builds on certain prior
expectations about the world. We empirically support this hypothesis for interpretations of scopallyambiguous sentences with a universal, existential,
and negative quantifier. In the process, we find
direct support for the idea that pragmatic factors
underpin adult interpretation behavior.
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Figure 2: Sample paraphrase endorsement trial.
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Results and discussion

Our model, which assumes a setting of the world
state prior from Savinelli et al., not only captures
the qualitative patterns in our data for this range of
quantifiers, but also largely captures the quantitative patterns as well. With a high positive expectation for the state of the world, the model predictions
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